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JUNE 28, 2024
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Make the mark.
DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
Comprehensive Financial Audit of E-SPLOST IV and
E-SPLOST V
June 28, 2024
Dr. Devon Horton
Superintendent
DeKalb County School District
1701 Mountain Industrial Blvd
Stone Mountain, Georgia 30083
Dear Dr. Horton,
Plante Moran has performed the procedures identified within the report below in accordance with
RFP 23-543 – E-SPLOST Comprehensive Audit for DeKalb County School District (the “District”).
The purpose of this audit was to assess the District’s management and oversight of funds received
via the E-SPLOST IV and E-SPLOST V referendums.
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We were not engaged to and did not perform a financial statement audit, the objective of which
would be the expression of an opinion on the District’s financial statements. Accordingly, we do
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not express such an opinion. Had we performed additional procedures, other matters might have
come to our attention that would have been reported to you.
Enclosed within this report is an executive summary of our findings to date, along with
recommendations for the District to improve its controls, policies, procedures, and oversight in an
effort to enhance governance of future E-SPLOST programs. Our team noted four areas of failure
by the District to effectively govern the management of taxpayer funds, and we have aligned our
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recommendations to provide the District with an opportunity to enhance procedures and
management oversight to reinforce the public’s trust in the District’s management of taxpayer
funds.
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Our team is working diligently alongside District personnel to complete the remaining
workstreams of our comprehensive audit. We plan to issue a draft final report to the District by
July 31, 2024.
We would like to thank District staff members for their support in providing documentation and
clarifications throughout this audit.
Sincerely,
Plante and Moran, PLLC
Results at a glance
$999m 15,000 12,000
Documents lost /
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Dollars evaluated Transactions evaluated destroyed and Categorical failures of
unavailable for audit key controls
Lack of policy, controls, and procedures
Management oversight not present
Training for key staff not in existence
Inaccuracies in recording, tracking, and accounting for large expenses
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Background
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The DeKalb County School District (the “District”) utilizes the “Education – Special Purpose Local Option
Sales Tax (“E-SPLOST”)” as a source of funds for District improvements. Use of this funding includes
capital projects including but not limited to new school construction, existing school renovations,
upgrades to school technology, procurement of musical instruments, and others as directed by the
DeKalb County School Board and its Superintendent. The funding for E-SPLOST projects comes via a
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one-penny consumption tax funded by all purchases within DeKalb County, GA. On November 8, 2011,
residents of DeKalb County voted in favor of approving the referendum related to E-SPLOST IV for a
term of 60 months. On December 5, 2016, the residents of DeKalb County voted to further extend the E-
SPLOST program via E-SPLOST V for an additional term of 60 months. For purposes of E-SPLOST capital
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project management, a joint effort of District management and a third-party project management team
contracted by the District are responsible for overseeing the selection of vendors, execution of the
contracted services, and quality of the construction.
During E-SPLOST IV and E-SPLOST V, the District underwent a major technology upgrade, replacing the
legacy ERP system, Crosspoint, with a cloud-based system, Munis. This upgrade resulted in a change in
procedures and documentation, which impacted the processes for procuring goods, recording E-SPLOST
ledger expenses, and disbursing E-SPLOST-related funds.
Through our review, we identified 4 key themes that summarize our detailed findings:
1. There was a lack of policies, procedures, and controls governing the E-SPLOST program
2. A lack of management oversight and approval over the E-SPLOST program
3. District staff did not have the proper training to effectively execute a controlled E-SPLOST
program
4. Multiple errors were noted in the recording, tracking, and accounting for large expenses
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Audit Scope
Plante Moran was engaged to conduct a comprehensive audit of the expenditures related to E-SPLOST-IV
and E-SPLOST V. The period of our audit included:
• E-SPLOST IV: July 1, 2012 – April 25, 2023
• E-SPLOST V: July 1, 2017 – August 15, 2023
During this period, 15,600 transactions totaling $999M were expended on E-SPLOST-related projects:
E-SPLOST Program Count of Transactions Total Expenses ($)
E-SPLOST IV 8,800 $605M
E-SPLOST V 6,800 $393M
Total 15,600 $999M
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Procedures
Our team utilized multiple methods of review to analyze the E-SPLOST IV and E-SPLOST V processes:
Inquiry: We interviewed key process owners from the District as well as major vendors to understand
their roles, responsibilities, and procedures related to E-SPLOST IV and E-SPLOST V.
Inspection: Our team inspected the documentation furnished by the district supporting transactions in
which E-SPLOST IV or E-SPLOST V funds were utilized to determine the legitimacy, business purpose,
accuracy, and approval process for the transaction. We also inspected documentation related to change
orders, vendor selection, project tracking, and close-out.
Reperformance/Recalculation: For instances where payment of a service was determined based upon
the percentage of completion, our team reperformed the calculation utilized to ensure its accuracy.
Analytics: After identifying the vendors paid with E-SPLOST IV and E-SPLOST V funds (explained
further in Finding #6 in the ensuing section), we performed data analytical tests on disbursements to
those vendors. For certain tests, such as identifying sequential invoice numbers, we performed analytics
on all invoices to those vendors paid in connection with E-SPLOST IV and E-SPLOST V funds during the
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scoping period. We weighted various tests to create a risk-based scoring system to identify higher-risk
vendors and transactions. The following is a list of tests performed:
No. Test Name
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Invoice Number Tests: Invoice numbers are an important aspect of invoicing as they make
it easier to track payments and manage overdue invoices. Anomalies in a vendor’s invoice
numbers may be indicative of fictitious payments, fictitious vendors, and/or erroneous
charges.
1. Sequential invoice numbers Sequential invoice numbers can be indicative of a
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potentially fictitious vendor, as it would indicate
they do not have other customers.
2. Invoice numbers of 100 or lower Typically, lower invoice numbers are indicative of
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newly established vendors. Newly established
vendors may present an operational risk and/or
could be indicative of a fictitious vendor.
3. Invoice numbers without numbers Invoice numbers that don’t include numbers (i.e.,
are comprised solely of text characters) would not
be expected (i.e., should be the exception versus the
norm).
4. Invoice dates as invoice numbers Invoice numbers that don’t include legitimate
numbers (i.e., are just the invoice date) would not be
expected (i.e., should be the exception versus the
norm).
5. Duplicate invoice numbers Duplicate invoice numbers may be indicative of a
fictitious charge or a fictitious vendor and/or may
lead to accidental duplicative payments.
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No. Test Name Test Description
Vendor Information Tests: A vendor master file (“VMF”) is a database that lists all vendors.
It typically includes key information about an organization’s vendors, including addresses,
key contacts, payment terms, EIN, etc. Anomalies in this data may signal fictitious vendors,
vendors with a conflict of interest involving employees, or poor record-keeping practices.
6. Invoices from vendors not on the A payment issued to, or invoice received from, a
vendor master file vendor not listed in the VMF can be indicative of a
problematic disbursement.
7. VMF to Employee Master File Vendors with matching characteristics, such as an
Comparison address, with an employee may indicate a fictitious
vendor.
8. Vendors with missing information A potential characteristic of a fictitious vendor is
that key information for the vendor is missing from
the VMF.
Vendor Payment Tests: We conducted various statistical and red-flag tests to identify
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vendors with anomalous payment activity.
9. Z-Score analysis A one-time payment to a vendor for an amount
significantly larger than other payments to that
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vendor can also be indicative of a fraudulent
payment. A Z-Score is a statistical measurement
that identifies payments that are outside the
expected amount compared to the average
payments for a vendor.
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10. Benford's Law Benford’s Law is a mathematical theory that applies
to large sets of randomly produced natural
numbers, such as AP disbursements. According to
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this theory, the number 1 occurs more frequently
than the number 9, resulting in an inverse
exponential distribution. Problematic payments, if
they exist, often deviate from Benford’s Law
because they are not random.
11. Round dollar amount invoices While legitimate disbursements may involve
rounded dollar amounts, perpetrators frequently
use these rounded amounts when issuing
problematic payments.
12. Trend of vendor payments over time One potential characteristic of a fictitious vendor
and/or a kickback scheme is the payments to the
vendor increase over time.
13. Vendors receiving only one payment A potential characteristic of a problematic
disbursement is that the payment was issued to a
vendor who received no other payments.
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Background Research: We identified employees at the District, as well as AECOM contractors, deemed
“key” to the E-SPLOST IV and E-SPLOST V programs. Key employees were defined as:
• Individuals involved in vendor selection, contract negotiation, and/or other procurement and
approval tasks, as identified through review of supporting documentation and organizational
charts; or
• Employees with E-SPLOST-related wages over $100,000 during the scope period
We conducted background research on these individuals using a variety of tools, including Thomson
Reuters CLEAR software 1, the Secretary of State Business Entity Search tools across multiple states, and
internet research. When an individual appeared to own a business, we also researched that business. We
compiled information regarding addresses associated with the key employees (and their businesses, if
applicable) and compared this information to the current VMF to identify potential matches (limited to
E-SPLOST vendors only).
Email Review: Leveraging information learned from our analytics, interviews, background research, and
document inspection, we determined our scope for reviewing emails to include the activity of
approximately 40 individuals. We extracted over 5,000,000 emails and attachments from the District’s
server in relation to these ~40 individuals.
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Summary of Findings
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Throughout the audit process, our team noted significant findings that either deviate from the stated
policy or are based upon our professional judgment and indicate a lack of control over E-SPLOST IV and
E-SPLOST V funds.
Finding Category Finding Detail
1. Policies Lack of enforceable policy to govern District processes
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2. Project Spend Tracking Incomplete and inaccurate ledger of E-SPLOST transactions
3. Contract procurement, Contracts were written in a manner that was not favorable to the
execution, and monitoring District and resulted in the overpayment of additional soft costs
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and a lack of spending oversight
4. Records Retention Documents to support the audit were not retained in accordance
with District policy
5. Vendor Selection Vendor selection teams were not appropriately split between
AECOM and District personnel
6. Purchase approval Purchases were initiated prior to approval of the purchase order
7. Accounting Errors Manual recording of expenses resulted in multiple uncorrected
errors
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https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/clear
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Finding #1 - Policies
Observation: The Policy and Procedures Manuals (“PPM”) were not developed to align with District
processes and were not communicated to District personnel. As a result, District personnel were
unfamiliar with the PPM, and there was no policy being adhered to throughout the E-SPLOST IV and E-
SPLOST V programs.
Background/Details: The District engaged URS Corporation (E-SPLOST IV) and AECOM Technical
Services, Inc. (E-SPLOST V) to prepare a policy manual for each E-SPLOST program. These policies,
referred to as the Program Procedures Manual (“PPM”), were intended to govern E-SPLOST spending and
detail the policies and procedures to ensure the E-SPLOST program adheres to legal and regulatory
requirements, as well as best practice processes.
Recommendation #1
The District should engage a third party to develop a policy and tracking mechanism for future E-
SPLOST programs that considers input from District personnel while taking into account any legal or
regulatory requirements. The policy should include the following attributes:
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1. Responsibilities for job roles involved in E-SPLOST programs
2. Timelines for process completion
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3. Decision-making authority limits
4. Process for communication of policy requirements to District personnel
5. Monitoring procedures to ensure compliance
6. Procedures for accurate document retention
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7. Oversight procedures in establishing the budget, scope, and schedule to ensure quality,
timeliness, and strong economics in project management (see Recommendation #3 for further
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details)
Suggested timeframe for implementation: Q1 FY 2025
Finding #2– Project Spend Tracking
Observation: The District did not maintain a complete and accurate ledger of E-SPLOST-related
transactions consisting of project, expense details, vendor, date, and amount. This issue appears to have
occurred because of the conversion to Munis in 2018, as well as a lack of appropriate supporting
documentation for journal entries.
Background/Details: We were provided a “Spend and Budget Report” for E-SPLOST IV and E-SPLOST V
separately. These reports summarize the total spent by phase (pre-construction, admin, architect, etc.)
through May 8, 2023, totaling $998M. However, the reports do not show the transaction details
comprising these amounts.
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When we requested the transaction details, we were provided various reports from Crosspoint and
Munis, which totaled $1.233B, a variance of over $200M. Much of this variance was due to transactional
data originally recorded in the legacy Crosspoint system being duplicated in Munis and/or imported into
Munis without vendor details. These duplicates and lack of vendor detail were not easily identifiable for
the purpose of tracking E-SPLOST project spend.
Additionally, during the implementation of Munis, some transactions were not coded with a project
string. The missing information caused Munis to inaccurately display/categorize certain expenditures in
comparison to the Spend and Budget Reports. As a result, only 171 of the 261 projects listed on the initial
transaction details provided to us reconciled to the Spend and Budget Reports, with a nearly $240M
unreconciled variance remaining.
Through extensive research into both systems (Crosspoint and Munis) transactional details, Munis
Project Detail History reports, Munis Project Journal Inquiry reports, and review of supporting
documentation, we constructed a detailed transaction ledger totaling $999,117,563 2, which agreed to the
Spend and Budget Reports.
After reconciling totals by project, there were still hundreds of line items missing key pieces of
information needed for analysis, such as who (i.e., what vendor) was paid and for how much, as many of
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the transactions were recorded via manual journal entries (i.e., batches), rather than individual
disbursements through accounts payable. Through additional review of journal entry documentation and
inquiries to District personnel, we identified the vendors paid for nearly all 15,000+ transactions included
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in the detailed listing.
There are 22 line items/journal entries totaling a negative ($461,310.85), for which vendor details could
not be identified. However, this amount is decreasing the total spend and, therefore, is likely the
reclassification of costs between projects, rather than unknown disbursements for which we have no
detail. Therefore, we have inherently tested the transactions/vendors related to these 22 line items.
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These inconsistencies and omissions in maintaining a complete and accurate transaction listing pose
significant challenges to the accurate tracking and management of E-SPLOST activities. They also
resulted in significant additional time in our engagement, as, in order to comprehensively test E-
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SPLOST-related spending, we needed the detailed components of what was spent.
Recommendation #2
The District should provide comprehensive training sessions, standard operating procedures, and
ongoing support to personnel responsible for financial record-keeping duties. Employees should have
the necessary knowledge and skills to effectively utilize the accounting system or software; Munis has
the capability to track spending by project, which should be leveraged for future E-SPLOST projects.
Trainings should cover topics such as data entry techniques, ledger reconciliation procedures, adequate
journal-entry documentation, and error resolution protocols. The District should encourage open
communication channels for employees to seek assistance or clarification on ledger-related matters.
Suggested timeframe for implementation: Q1-Q2 FY 2025
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The $841,340 difference between the $998M in the Spend and Budget Reports and the $999M in our detailed transaction
listing is a result of the timing between obtaining the Spend and Budget Reports and later creating a detailed transaction
listing. We included the additional $841,340 of detailed transactions in our analysis.
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Finding #3 – Contract Procurement, Execution, and Monitoring
Observation: The District’s contractual and financial processes of implementing capital improvements
from procurement and planning through construction and close-out can be significantly improved from
its current state. This includes procurement documentation, establishing and tracking the budget-to-
actual costs from the planning phase through construction (including contingencies), and close-out
activities.
Background/Details:
Contract Forms
We reviewed the construction management proposals, contracts, and Payment Applications for fifteen
(15) capital projects (5 new construction and 10 renovations/additions) as part of E-SPLOST IV and E-
SPLOST V. From our review of the procurement process, the District utilizes its own set of construction
contracts and issues request for qualifications and proposals for individual projects in alignment with
industry practices. For the new construction projects, the original contracts for pre-construction match
the proposing firms’ proposed fee for pre-construction services. We found instances of executed contract
forms with blank line items related to fees and costs for construction services (i.e., Construction
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Manager (CM) fees, staffing, general conditions, insurance, etc.).
Under normal industry, standard documents such as AIA documents, EJCDC documents, or Consensus
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documents, a separate document called the “General Conditions of Construction” governs the processes
associated with administering the construction process and outlines the “cost of work” and change
orders/contingencies. Additionally, this document is incorporated into both the Architect Engineer
(“AE”) and CM/General Contractor (“GC") contracts as a “bridging” document to ensure that the separate
obligations of the AE and CM under their respective contracts align to allow for the smooth
administration of the work. In the Dekalb County School District contract documents, we observed that
there is no such bridging document, which could give rise to coordination issues during construction
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administration.
In addition, we observed in the CM GMP Lump Sum contracts that the scope of work was articulated by a
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general reference to the drawings, project manual, and addendum. The best practice is to provide more
specificity of the project documents by including the dates published and the control version and/or
having the AE provide their index of drawings and specifications (with dates of final issuance) for
incorporation. This will help to avoid disputes over what version of the documents formed the basis of
the contract.
Payment Applications
Observed multiple instances where the architect of record did not certify the Application for Payment.
The architect’s certification is a critical control as an independent representation of the architect’s belief
that the work has progressed to the point of the requested payment and that the work is in general
conformance with the contract requirements. It also allows the review of change orders and an allocation
as to the cause of such (field condition, error or omission, missing bid scops, AHJ requested change,
unforeseen conditions, etc.)
We did not observe any sworn statements included in payment applications. While not contractually
obligated, the inclusion of sworn statements is a best practice requiring the CM/GC to attest that the
contractors listed are the only contractors providing labor and materials and that the breakdown of costs
is accurate.
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Sworn statements allow the Owner to monitor the flow of costs among the CM/GC and subcontractors,
secure appropriate waivers, and identify all potential claimants, secure appropriate waivers. An industry
standard AIA G907-2022 could be used.
While lien waivers/releases were included in some payment applications, not all payment applications
included these documents. Without a supporting sworn statement, it is impossible to determine if all
waivers and releases were provided.
Bonding/Insurances
Bonding of the prime CM/GC is required by GA law for public contracts. A CM on a cost-plus contract
often requires their subcontractors to also provide a bond protecting the CM against a subcontractor’s
default at the Owner’s cost. The CM is already responsible for the subcontractor’s performance or lack of
performance; no meaningful benefit to the Owner is provided by double bonding. Observed instances of
double bonding being listed in the schedule of values, but no bond information was provided to
substantiate the procurement of a bond.
Instead of a subcontractor bond, some CMs attempt to secure a subcontractor default insurance (“SDI”)
policy or provide self-insurance. As with a subcontractor bond, SDI is a protection measure for the CM
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provided at the Owner’s cost with no meaningful benefit being provided to the Owner. Observed
instances of CMs seeking payment for SDI policies without backup, demonstrating any policy was
procured.
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Cost Plus Contracts
Upon reviewing the contracts and payment applications, we observed instances of large change orders
ranging from $5,000,000 up to $22,942,000. These change orders are part of the construction
management process of bidding out the individual trade contracts and assigning these to the engaged
Construction Manager. Included with the change orders are costs associated with the CM fee, staffing,
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general conditions, and insurance.
It is best practice to have contractual terms governing the use of the contingency (e.g., specifying a
procedure for the use, the allowable uses, and a drawdown schedule for the return of unused contingency
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to the Owner over the duration of the Project). Did not observe adequate contingency controls within the
cost-plus contracts relative to the original budget to actual costs, cause of the contingency, reallocation
of unused contingency, etc.
It is best practice to maintain an Owner Contingency within an overall project budget; observed
instances where the Owner Contingency was held within the CM Guaranteed Maximum Price. This is not
a preferred practice given:
1. If the Owner Contingency is within the GMP, there is a lack of contingency controls, and the CM
is entitled to charge a fee for it
2. If outside the CM contract, Owner contingency can be used for other contracts and costs at the
owner’s discretion
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Recommendation #3
The District should conduct a comprehensive overview of its Construction Management contract
documents and incorporate industry “best practice” processes relative to defining fees, staffing, general
conditions, insurance, and contingency use. In addition, bridging documents and more specificity of the
project bidding documents, including the dates published, control version, and/or having the AE provide
their index of drawings and specifications (with dates of final issuance) for incorporation.
Included in the contract review process, the District should conduct a comprehensive overview of the
Payment Application process to ensure that multiple departments are reviewing, receiving, and
approving the applications for payment, including the application of the proper CM costs, including fees,
staffing, general conditions, contingency use, allowance use, and insurances and that multiple
departments received and retain these records accordingly.
Suggested timeframe for implementation: Q1-Q2 FY 2025
Finding #4 – Records Retention
Observation: The District did not maintain records in an organized and auditable manner. Additionally,
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the District failed to appropriately maintain records in accordance with the DeKalb County School
District Records Retention Schedule, dated 2013.
Background/Details: E-SPLOST-related records prior to conversion to the Munis ERP system, if
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retained, were maintained in paper form and stored in a disaggregated fashion at several District
locations. 46,404 documents were requested to complete detailed testing of the expenses. The requested
documents consisted of invoices, evidence of approval, and evidence of payment for each expense.
Requests for the District to produce documentation, if fulfilled, often took 90 or more days.
Per Section 10 – “Property” of the retention schedule, records related to capital construction must be
maintained for 11 years after the completion of the project. To date, there are 12,098 documents that have
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been confirmed either lost or destroyed and unable to be audited. Details regarding the documents
confirmed lost or destroyed are in the table below:
E-SPLOST
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Documentation Type Count Confirmed Lost or Destroyed (by expense line item)
Program
IV Invoices 1,941
IV Payment Approval 2,023
IV Payment Support 2,343
IV Purchasing Terms 4,403
V Invoices 250
V Payment Approval 290
V Payment Support 23
V Purchasing Terms 825
Total 12,098
Through testing procedures, our team learned the District did not communicate the need to retain
records to team members, as many individuals were unaware of the required retention policies.
Additionally, District management did not execute a monitoring program to ensure records were
retained in accordance with applicable policies.
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Recommendation #4
The District should develop and deploy a records retention training program for all District personnel.
This training includes the following:
1. Awareness of governing policies in place from a District and regulatory standpoint
2. Instruction that multiple retention timelines may apply to a single document. In these instances,
the longest of the applicable timelines applies
3. Best practices for storage contemplating security, structured folders, and searchability
4. Procedures for effective disposal
Additionally, the District should develop and execute a management monitoring program to routinely
review the effectiveness of the District’s records retention policy. This should focus on selecting key
documents within each department on a rotating schedule to evaluate whether these documents have
been retained or not retained in accordance with applicable policies. This will allow future audits of E-
SPLOST expenditures to be executed in a timely, efficient manner and improve the District’s adherence
to the DeKalb County School District Records Retention Schedule.
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Suggested timeframe for implementation: Q1 – Q2 FY 2025
Finding #5 – Vendor Selection
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Observation: Selection committees to determine vendors to provide services paid for with E-SPLOST
funding were not comprised of sufficient and adequate team members, as recommended by the policy. Of
329 vendor scoresheets analyzed, we noted that 68% did not have the appropriate split between DCSD
personnel and third-party project management personnel.
Background/Details: The District utilized selection committees to determine vendors to provide services
paid for with E-SPLOST funding. Per the PPM, the following guidelines for selection team compositions
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are recommended:
1. E-SPLOST IV
a. Two DCSD team members
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b. Two third-party project management team members
2. E-SPLOST V
a. Three DCSD team members
b. Two third-party project management team members
In our analysis, we noted the following:
1. E-SPLOST IV
a. 2 out of 243 score sheets had less than 4 evaluators
b. 104 of the 241 projects had more DCSD team members than third-party project
management team members
2. E-SPLOST V
a. 48 out of 85 score sheets had less than 5 evaluators
b. 4 out of 85 score sheets had more third-party project management team members than
DCSD team members. In all 4 instances, contracts were awarded to Evergreen
Construction
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Recommendation #5
The District should implement a monitoring program for the Procurement Department to ensure
representation on selection committees is in line with policy and best practices. This monitoring
program should include an objective review prior to vendor evaluation to ensure the individuals assigned
to the selection committee are in alignment with applicable policies. A component of the vendor
selection process should include a certification from the Procurement Department that the selection
committee was aligned with applicable policies.
Additionally, on at least a semi-annual basis, the Internal Audit Department should execute reviews of
the Procurement Department’s adherence to these policies by selecting a sample of vendor evaluations to
validate that the selection committee representation is appropriate.
Suggested timeframe for implementation: Q2-Q3 FY 2025
Finding #6 – Purchase Approval
Observation: The District did not have a process for ensuring purchase orders were created and
approved prior to the purchase being made and invoice being generated by the vendor. In instances in
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which a purchase order was not available for audit, management indicated an accounting transmittal
form could be leveraged. To date, 3,720 transactions (24%) did not have a purchase order or transmittal
form that contained all approvals as required by policy.
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Background/Details: Through inquiry with District personnel, it was noted that in instances where a
purchase order was not available and an invoice was due to be paid, the District utilized “after the fact
purchase orders,” in which the individual requesting payment of the invoice would approve the purchase
of the goods after delivery and invoicing had already occurred.
Recommendation #6
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The District should ensure that the policy is clear and enforced that purchases are not to be made
without a fully approved purchase order from Munis.
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Suggested timeframe for implementation: Q1 FY 2025
Finding #7 – Accounting Errors
Observation: Multiple accounting errors were identified:
1. An invoice in the amount of $1,365 was passed through to the District for the same services as
another invoice for $1,365; however, the invoices contained different invoice numbers. The
invoice was paid to the vendor twice.
2. Two invoices with the same invoice numbers and the same services were paid to the vendor
twice. The two invoices totaled $505. The invoices were processed by the District and paid twice
on separate checks.
3. For E-SPLOST IV, there was one expenditure in which there was a discrepancy in the amount
invoiced from the vendor and the amount paid to the vendor. The total difference was $1,070.
4. For E-SPLOST V, there were $2.1m in expenses that were recorded to incorrect projects and were
not corrected.
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Background/Details: Recording of expenses was performed by manual entry. A lack of management
oversight and effective controls resulted in errors not being identified to be corrected.
Recommendation #7
The District should ensure team members are trained on how to effectively review invoices for specific
services. Team members should track long-term projects for services previously invoiced and ensure
services are not invoiced multiple times.
Suggested timeframe for implementation: Q1 FY 2025
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